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Optimal Federalism Across Institutions: Theory and
Applications from Environmental and Health Care
Policies
Dale B. Thompson*
Simply because you have a problem that needs addressing, it's not
necessarily
the case that Federal legislation is the best way to address
1
it.
- United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
addressing the United States Senate
Instead of turning immediately to federal legislation, the question of
"federalism" then becomes: When is federal action appropriate, and
when should the problem be addressed by the states? Over the past
fifteen years, courts and legal scholars have attempted to answer this
question. This Article presents a framework that provides a new
technique to answer this question. This framework analyzes federalism
across enactment, implementation, and enforcement institutions, by
examining economies and diseconomies of scale inherent in each of
these institutions. This Article then applies the framework to a

* J.D. (Stanford Law School, 1998), Ph.D. (Economics, Stanford University, 1998). A
number of people have made significant contributions to this article. It has benefited from many
helpful comments and suggestions from former U.S. Senator David F. Durenberger, Saul
Levmore, Jonathan R. Nash, Shubha Ghosh, George B. Shepherd, and seminar participants at the
Canadian Law & Economics Association Conference, Pacific Southwest Academy of Legal
Studies in Business Conference, Midwestern Law & Economics Association Annual Meeting,
and the Western Academy of Legal Studies in Business Conference. I would also like to thank a
number of agency staff for offering me insightful information about health care and
environmental policies, including George Hoffman, Shawn Welch, and Susan Snyder of the State
of Minnesota Department of Human Services; Peggy Clark, Bruce R. Johnson, Gerald Zelinger,
and Donna Schmidt of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; Richard Baker and Doug
Norris of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources; T. J. Miller of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service; David Weirens of the Minnesota Board of Water & Soil Resources; Mark
Gernes of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency; and Susan Elston of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. This research has also been supported by grants from the Opus College of
Business, University of St. Thomas.
I. Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 59-60 (2003) (statement of
Sen. Russell D. Feingold), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/108hrgl
92548.pdf.
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comparison of environmental policies for wetlands and endangered
species, and in an analysis of a health care policy. These applications
can then serve as guides to legislators and judges as they grapple with
the question of federalism.
Federalism, an American invention put forward in the drafting of the

Constitution, 2 posits that parallel government systems operate in their
own spheres of authority over shared constituencies. These spheres of
authority may overlap. When they do, conflicts arise in defining these
spheres, and in managing relations among them. During its first two
hundred years, American federalism underwent a number of changes as
our understanding of it altered in the face of dramatic circumstances.
These developments have accelerated during the past fifteen years,

through advances in jurisprudence, legal scholarship, and through new
legislation and governmental programs
In a sequence of cases including United States v. Lopez,3 United
States v. Morrison,4 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 5 Gonzales v. Raich,6 and
Rapanos v. United States,7 the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to
articulate limits to the federal sphere that had seemed to disappear since
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.8 was decided in 1937. 9 This
2. Federalism originated with the six nations of the Iroquois confederacy (the Mohawk,
Oneida, Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and the Tuscarora). There is a scholarly debate over the
influence of the Iroquois confederacy in the drafting of the Constitution. See Frederick M. Wirt,
Book Reviews, in 13 PUBLIUS 97, 97-99 (1983) (reviewing BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN
FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1982)).
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (stating that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority because possession of firearms in a school
zone was not economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).
4. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause
could not provide Congress the ability to enact civil remedies for the Violence Against Women
Act).
5. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170
(2001) (holding that extending the definition of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act to
include intrastate waters inhabited by migratory birds exceeded permissible authority of the Army
Corps).
6. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (stating that criminalizing the manufacture,
distribution, or possession of marijuana by intrastate growers did not violate the Commerce
Clause).
7. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 718 (2006) (explaining that "navigable waters"
under the Clean Water Act only applies to relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodes of
water). A related case, Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, was consolidated with
Rapanos. Id. at 764.
8. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937) (determining that intrastate
activities may nevertheless be controlled by Congress if the activity is closely and substantially
related to interstate commerce).
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jurisprudence coincided with advances in legal scholarship in the field
of "New Federalism," which sought to re-address the theoretical
underpinnings of federalism, including the "race-to-the-bottom" theory,

public choice theory, the "laboratories of democracy" theory,' 0 and

"economies of scale" theory. These theories were examined with
particular reference to environmental policies by a number of
11
scholars.

Additionally, the takeover of Congress by a Republican majority in
1994 led to a number of developments in the law governing relations
between the federal government and the states, foremost of which was
welfare reform through the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.12 At the same time, health
care costs rose significantly, leading to a declaration by some of a
"health care crisis."' 13 A significant amount of research followed to
address the role of federalism in health policy. 14
Its
This Article integrates these developments in federalism.
principal contribution comes from its suggestion that analysis of
federalism issues should be conducted at the level of individual
institutions. Institutions consist of the set of rules and structures that
govern human interaction. 15 Public policy is the product of a network
of institutions, including enactment, implementation, and enforcement

9. The decision in this case was announced two months after the proposal of the so called
"court-packing" Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, in which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought the
authority to appoint additional justices to the Supreme Court after the Court's rulings in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding that regulating the
poultry industry exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause), and U.S. v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (holding that processing taxes under the Agricultural Adjustment Act were
unconstitutional).
10. This theory refers to a quote of Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
11. See infra Part II.C (discussing environment policy cases, particularly those that relate to
the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act).
12. See Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
13. When Bill Clinton accepted the Democratic nomination in 1992, he "vow[ed] to 'take on
the health care profiteers and make health care affordable for every family'" See Public
Broadcasting Service, Online Forum, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forummay96/background/
health-debate-pagel.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). Others disagreed with the declaration of a
health care crisis, including Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who stated that "there is 'no health
care crisis."' Id.
14. See infra Part II.D (discussing health care literature and health care reform).
15. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991) (defining institutions
as "the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction").
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institutions. Analyzing federalism by looking at the full network can
become increasingly complex. This Article clarifies our understanding
of federalism by scrutinizing these institutions separately.
In its analysis of individual institutions, this Article also provides a
criterion that can serve as an alternative limit to federal power under the
Commerce Clause, a limit that the Rehnquist Court seemed to seek in
Lopez and Morrison. Conversely, this Article also provides another
16
criterion as to when federal preemption would be appropriate.
Furthermore, while the most recent analyses of federalism's role in
policymaking have focused on a single subject area, this Article
expands its analysis to examine implications for environmental and
health policies.
Starting with a general model, this paper describes a framework for
assessing the proper locus of different aspects of a public policy. This
framework takes into consideration the multi-institutional aspects of a
public policy.
Within each institution, this framework uses an
efficiency criterion, focusing on tradeoffs between economies of scale
and diseconomies of scale.
It then applies this approach to a wide array of public policies,
ranging from environmental policies to health policies. Through these
applications, this Article demonstrates the importance of considering
federalism issues across individual institutions. It also shows the
usefulness of considering economies and diseconomies of scale in
assessing federalism. Legislators and judges can use these applications
as guides to assess the appropriate role of federalism in solving public
policy problems at the lowest cost.
The rest of this Article begins with a review of recent "New
Federalism" jurisprudence, followed by a review of some of the
literature addressing federalism in the context of environmental policy
and health care policy. It then offers a framework for analyzing
federalism across institutional dimensions. Using this framework, this
Article examines federalism issues in a comparison between policies for
protecting endangered species and wetlands. After that, we analyze
federalism issues in the healthcare policy of using managed care
organizations (MCOs) to service Medicaid beneficiaries.

16. Under federal preemption, when the federal government legislates in a particular subject
area, this federal legislation preempts state legislation addressing the same subject area. As a
result, the state legislation cannot be enforced. For more on preemption, see Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008) (holding that FDA pre-approval preempted state common law
claims of negligence and strict liablilty). The author would like to thank Senator Durenberger for
suggesting the additional implication of this article.
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REVIEW OF FEDERALISM, ALONG WITH LITERATURE RELATING
FEDERALISM TO ENVIRONMENTAL & HEALTH POLICIES

A. A Brief History of Federalism in the United States, and the
Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism" Decisions in Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich
The rise of a powerful, central federal government was brought about
by the Civil War, when the nation's survival depended upon the ability
of the federal government to marshal the full resources of the Northern
states to defeat the Confederacy. Over the next seventy years, a
backlash against that power developed, culminating in the A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,17 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the National Industrial Recovery Act was
unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause.
However, shortly thereafter, a sequence of cases including NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., United States v. Darby,18 and Wickard v.
Filburn1 9 "ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under
that Clause." 20 These cases were decided against the backdrop of the
Great Depression and World War II. As during the Civil War, the allencompassing nature of these threats to the nation led to a significant
increase in the need for a strong federal government. For the next fifty
years, the Court did not strike down any federal legislation as exceeding
the scope of the Commerce Clause. 2 1 During this time, the Court
upheld Congress's authority to legislate over civil rights 22 and moral
wrongs. 2 3 Almost no issue seemed outside the orbit of Congressional
power.

17. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
18. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (holding that Congress had power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions).
19. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III, 124 (1942) (declaring that even personal consumption
of agricultural products affected interstate commerce enough that the Commerce Clause enabled
Congress to regulate it).
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
21. See Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995) (referring to Lopez as a significant break in a
line of cases deferring to Congressional action).
22. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (stating that Congress was reasonable
in determining that racial discrimination at restaurants that received goods from out of state
adversely affected interstate commerce).
23. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,277 (1964) (finding that, in an
effort to fight discrimination, Congress acted well within its Commerce Clause jurisdiction when
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However, in the 1995 case, United States v. Lopez,2 4 the Court held
that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority when it enacted the
federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. The Court found that there
were "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power:" 2 5 "the use of the channels of interstate
commerce," "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce," and "those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce." 2 6 The Court found that the
possession of a gun in a school zone did not have a "substantial relation
to interstate commerce." In reaching this conclusion, it found that
possession of a gun was "in no sense an economic activity. '"27 Also, the
court rejected arguments that connected the education process with later
commercial activity. Extension of this argument would make it
"difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power." 28 Consequently,
Congress did not have the authority to enact this law under the
Commerce Clause.
In United States v. Morrison,29 the Court again looked at whether
Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause, this time for 42
U.S.C. § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act. The Court held
that gender-based violence had an insufficient relation to interstate
commerce, and held the act unconstitutional. Similar to Lopez, the
Court held that arguments connecting the effects of a violent crime to
every possible effect on interstate commerce "would allow Congress to
regulate any crime." 30
It rejected this extension, stating, "[flhe
limitation of Congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative
grace."31
In Gonzales v. Raich,3 2 the Court held that regulation of the
production and distribution of marijuana could enable enforcement
against a completely intrastate activity. It held that the activities of

it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
25. Id. at 558.
26. Id. at 558-59. Note, these categories were very similar to the three matters proposed by
Richard A. Epstein. Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1454 (1987) ("[I]nterstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities
closely incident to them.").
27. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567
28. Id. at 564.
29. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (defining 42 U.S.C. § 13981 to
provide a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence).

30. Id. at 599.
31.
32.

Id. at 616.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 3 (2005).
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growing and distributing marijuana were "quintessentially economic."
As a result, regulation of these activities, even though they might be
wholly intrastate, was within the scope of the Commerce Power.
These decisions generated a rebirth of interest in federalism. Some
authors examined the theory behind federalism; others looked at the
impact these decisions might have on specific subject areas; and yet
others did both.
B. Theories on Federalism

Theories on federalism began with the Federalist Papers. In
FederalistPaper#51,34 James Madison posited that a division of power
among both state and federal governments would help prevent
"factions" 35 from using the mechanism of government to take steps
It does this by having the
contrary to the interest of the general public. 36
two governmental bodies constrain each other.
Almost 150 years later, Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in New
State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, provided another theory to support
37
federalism: that a state may act as a "laboratory" of democracy.
Under this theory, the federal system improves long-run welfare by
permitting different states to attempt different methods to address a
public need, comparing the results of these methods, and then having
other states then adopt the more successful methods.
This laboratory might be financed through "cooperative
federalism," 3 8 under which the federal government does not directly

33. Id. at 2. Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had written the majority opinions in
Lopez and Morrison, was in the minority in Raich.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), available at http://www.constitution.org/
fed/federa51 .htm.
35. For more on "factions," see THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), available at
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federalO.htm.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 34. Madison notes:
[P]ower surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself.
Id.
37. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38. For more on cooperative federalism, see Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (examining the problems in implementing federal policies through
state and local officials and examining the constitutionality of delegation); Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L.
REv. 205 (1997) (discussing the political reality and constitutional history of cooperative
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regulate behavior, but instead financially supports states that implement
policies consistent with federal goals, while at the same time permitting
the states to choose the means to achieve those goals. Constitutional
authority for this mechanism is provided by the General Welfare
Clause. 3 9 In the 1992 case, New York v. United States n4 the Supreme
Court held that there are limits to "cooperative federalism," namely that
Congress cannot "commandeer the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program." 4 1 However, Congress may make the receipt of federal funds
conditional, and also may "offer States the choice of regulating that
activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted
42
by federal regulation."
Critiquing this decision, Joshua Sarnoff argues that, under certain
circumstances, "the Supreme Court should find that the delegation or
effective delegation of federal legislative power to states violates the
Constitution." 4 3 To support this, Sarnoff notes that "Congress does not
need to delegate legislative power to states to effectuate federal policies,
because Congress may delegate broad policymaking powers to federal
agencies." 4 4 As a result, he concludes that "the Court should invalidate
cooperative federalism statutes when Congress has not demonstrated
that they will result in better, more effitient, or more accountable
45
governance."
In the year following New State Ice Co., Justice Brandeis is credited
with providing yet another theory about federalism in another dissent in
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee: the "race to the bottom." 4 6 Under this
theory, an overarching federal power is necessary to protect states from
"ruinous competition." 47 This theory is an application of game theory's
"Prisoner's Dilemma."

federalism, as well as arguing for invalidation of insufficiently supported delegation of federal
power to the states).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1 ("Congress shall have power to ...provide for the.., general
welfare."). See also Sarnoff, supra note 38, at 206; Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialFederalism and
the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L.REV.377, 437 (2005).
40. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
41. Id. at 145 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,

288 (1981)).
42. Id. at 145.
43. Sarnoff, supra note 38, at 211.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
47. See Alvin K. Klevorick, Reflections on the Race to the Bottom, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 459, 460 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E.
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Drawing on Charles Tiebout, 48 public choice theory provides a
response to the "race to the bottom" theory. In a sequence of articles,
Richard Revesz explains that competition among states to attract
residents leads to an efficient matching process between residents with
different tastes for protection and states offering different levels of
49
protection.
Another public choice theory, drawing on Mancur Olson, 50 suggests
that states are more likely to suffer from "regulatory capture."
Regulatory capture is when administrative agencies are "captured" by
an industry to the point that the agency makes decisions that, while
benefiting the industry, are detrimental to general welfare.
A more general theory is that of "economies of scale." Under this
theory, there are economies of scale in regulation, and so the larger
scale of a federal approach would make it more efficient. In contrast,
others suggest that due to the benefits of "decentralization" whereby the
locus of decision-making is distributed to a number of nodes, a smaller
scale such as that of a state government is more efficient.
C. Review of EnvironmentalPolicy Cases and Literature
In addition to articles and books examining federalism in general, the
cases discussed above led to a particular interest in the application of
Two areas of
Lopez and Morrison to environmental policy.
environmental policy in particular were thought ripe for a Commerce
Clause challenge: wetlands policy under the Clean Water Act and
protection of species under the Endangered Species Act. This was
because the subject matter regulated under these policies was primarily
intra-state. A number of authors examined the impact of the new
federalism on both of these environmental policies, including Peter
Hudec eds., 1996).
48. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416
(1956) (presenting a model regarding the level of expenditures for local public goods).
49. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor Federal EnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210
(1992) (discussing environmental regulation at the federal level); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to
the Bottom and FederalEnvironmentalRegulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535,
536-45 (1997) (indicting the race to the bottom rationale for federal environment regulation). See
also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558 (2001) (pointing out that the relative strengths of environmental and
industry groups at the federal and state levels determine whether the environment is
"underregulat[ed]" at the state level, and using empirical data to examine the effectiveness of
states as environmental regulators).
50.

See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS 5 (1965) (looking at the theories surrounding groups and their interests and
dispelling previous beliefs).
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Sarnoff,53 Lori Warner, 54 David
Swire, 5 1 Daniel Esty, 52 Joshua
56

Linehan, 55 and A. Dan Tarlock.
In the midst of this scholarly debate, two cases appeared on the
Supreme Court docket: Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 57 and Rapanos v. United

States.58 These cases seemed to provide opportunities for the Court to
apply the jurisprudence of Lopez and Morrison to wetlands. However,
the Court instead decided these cases on other grounds.
In SWANCC, the Court had the opportunity to determine whether
federal jurisdiction in the regulation of intrastate wetlands was
appropriate under the Commerce Clause. However, the Court based its
decision on statutory interpretation, rather than constitutional authority,
holding that the Corps's "migratory bird rule" was not authorized under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
In Rapanos, the Court, although unable to reach a majority, vacated
and remanded the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals that
favored the Corps' interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Rather than
applying federalism principles, the plurality opinion and Justice

51. See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failuresin Competition Among Jurisdictionsin Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
67, 69-70 (1996). This article presents a two-dimensional structure to the question of the "race to
the bottom:" laxity versus strictness, and desirable versus undesirable. Id. With this structure, it
then challenges some of the assumptions of competitive models of the race to the bottom and
shows that, under certain conditions, there may be a race to undesirable laxness. Id. at 94-105.
52. See Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996)
(arguing that determination of the appropriate scale of environmental regulation depends on the
particular characteristics of the environmental challenge that is being addressed).
53. Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective)for
Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 240-51 (1997)
(responding to the claim that federal regulation decreases social welfare because states cannot act
in keeping with their citizen's preferences).
54. See generally Lori Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on
Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F 321 (1997) (assessing the vulnerability
of various environmental statutes).
55. David Linehan, Note, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No
Longer Be Suitable Habitatfor EndangeredSpecies and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. Riv. L. &
POL. 365 (1998) (analyzing whether the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act are proper
exercises under the Commerce Clause, in light of United States v. Lopez).
56. A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed Management, 20
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 149, 171 (2002) (pointing out the consistencies between wetlands and
endangered species policies in that they "seek to protect biologically sensitive lands such as
wetlands and endangered species habitats by preventing development within the confines of the
Court's takings frameworks").
57. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
58. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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Kennedy's concurrence both focused on interpretation of the terms

"waters of the United States" and "navigable waters." Kennedy
suggested that navigable waters "must possess a 'significant nexus' to

waters that are or were navigable in fact." 59 As a result, the impact of
Lopez and Morrison on the regulation of wetlands remains uncertain.

A number of other authors examined wetlands and endangered
species separately. Vickie Sutton 60 and Jonathan Adler 61 published
articles on wetlands protection prior to SWANCC. After SWANCC

failed to conclusively decide the federalism issue for wetlands, a
number of other articles discussed this topic, including another by
Adler 6 2 and one by Edward Fitzgerald. 63 Those examining the
Endangered Species Act include Omar White, 64 Bradford Mank, 65 and
66
Kevin Cassidy.
D. Literatureon Health Policies

In the 1990s, health care reform became an important topic. In
particular, the Medicaid program grew significantly during the 1980s
and 1990s, representing forty percent of federal payments to states by

59. Id. at 759.
60. Vickie V. Sutton, Wetlands Protection-A Goal Without a Statute, 7 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 179
(1998) (discussing the idea that a Congressional determination that wetlands must be preserved
would provide a constitutional basis for wetlands protection).
61. Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1 (1999)
(addressing the extent to which United States v. Lopez limits the federal government's authority
to regulate wetlands).
62. Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism,9
SUP. CT.ECON. REV. 205 (2001) (arguing that SWANNC was not an obstacle to environmental
protection by the federal government).
63. Edward A. Fitzgerald, Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs: Isolated Waters, Migratory Birds, Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation,43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. II (2003) (examining the migratory bird rule in light of the Court's current
approach to the Commerce Clause).
64. Omar White, Comment, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q.
215 (2000) (pointing to the additional authority of the Treaty Power to support the E.S.A.).
65. Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered
Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723 (2002) (examining the impact of the court's decision in
United States v. Morrison and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers on the Endangered Species Act).
66. Kevin Cassidy, Comment, Endangered Species' Slippery Slope Back to the States:
Existing Regulatory Mechanisms and Ongoing Conservation Efforts Under the Endangered
Species Act, 32 ENVTL. L. 175 (2002) (analyzing the drafting policy of the endangered species'
listing agencies in light of the purpose, language, and legislative history of the Endangered
Species Act).
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the mid 1990s.67 In 1993, the Clinton administration proposed a
comprehensive health care reform package. 68 Although never enacted,
this proposal spurred further debate on health care reform. After the
Lopez decision and the enactment of welfare reform, a number of
authors examined the implications of federalism on Medicaid policy.
One author pointed out that devolution of health policy had been
"ongoing" for a number of years. 69 Another explained that the "impact

of new federalism" is that "pursu[it of] our national public health
agenda" will depend on utilizing the "means" provided by our
70
"federalist system of government, namely the police powers of states."
A number of analyses were published in Medicaid and Devolution: A
View from the States, edited by Frank J. Thompson and John J.
Dilulio.7 1 In one chapter, Thompson examines whether states can
accept more responsibility for Medicaid, focusing on their governing
and fiscal capacities, along with their commitment to Medicaid. He
concludes that devolution should follow "a more incremental, calibrated
approach . . . pay[ing] particular attention to implementation . . .72and
assign[ing] a critical scorekeeping role to the national government."
67. Frank J. Thompson, Federalism and the Medicaid Challenge, in MEDICAID AND
DEVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 258, 259 (Frank J. Thompson & John J. Dilulio eds.,
1998).
68. President's Address to the Joint Session of the Congress on Health Care Reform, 29
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1836 (Sept. 22, 1993). See also Health Security Act, H.R. 3600,
103d Cong. (1993).
69. Thomas J. Anton, New Federalism and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships: The
Implicationsfor Health Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 691, 691 (1997) (pointing out that
significant reform of health policy already had taken place in the states, but reminding of limits to
the effectiveness of devolution, due to the benefits of specialization).
70. James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J. L. &
HEALTH 309, 313 (1998).
71. MEDICAID AND DEVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM THE STATES, supra note 67.
72. Thompson, supra note 67, at 260. Many other authors have analyzed federalism and
health care. See, e.g., John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care Regulatory Chaos Through a
RestructuredFederalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327 (2001) (arguing that dual regulatory systems
by both state and federal governments lead to conflicting policies, duplication, and too-high costs,
and then making recommendations to enable more standardization and coordination); Stephen M.
Davidson, Politics Matters! Health Care Policy and the Federal System, 22 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 879 (1997) (commenting on other articles in the symposium and focusing on the role
of political constraints on coordination between federal and state governments to solve national
health problems); Joan H. Krause, Forward:Federal-State Conflicts in Health Care, 3 HoUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 151 (2003) (reviewing a symposium of articles examining the tensions
between federal and state approaches to health care); ROBERT HURLEY & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN,
URBAN INST., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: STATE FLEXIBILITY IN ACTION (2002), available at
http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/310449.pdf (examining the use of managed care for
Medicaid and the variations across states including innovations). Another set of analyses was
published in 2003 in Federalism & Health Policy, edited by John Holahan, Alan Weir, and
Joshua M. Wiener. FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY (John Holahan, Alan Weir & Joshua M.
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E. Institutional TransactionCost Theory
Some of these articles do address the role of economies of scale in
comparing the desirability of a federal versus a state approach to these
policies. Others have suggested that policies could utilize cooperative
federalism to spread responsibilities for these policies across local, state,
and federal governments. However, none have provided a structured
approach to determining the optimal locus of policies across each of the

enactment, implementation, and enforcement institutions.
This Article will do so, utilizing the institutional transaction cost
framework. 73 Institutional transaction costs are the "costs of the
institutions that support public policies," and "they include the costs of
enacting a policy by the legislature, implementing that policy by an
administrative agency, and enforcing that policy by the agency and the
courts." 7 4
This framework suggests that in comparing policies, one
should choose a policy that had the least aggregate sum of compliance
75
costs, enactment costs, implementation costs, and enforcement costs.

Wiener eds., 2003). See also John Holahan, Alan Weir & Joshua M. Wiener, Which Way for
Federalism and Health Policy?, HEALTH AFF., July 16, 2003, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w3.317vl.pdf (arguing for the need for additional investment by the federal
government to enable increased eligibility for Medicaid by the poor). In addition to these
analyses, the Urban Institute began a project, "Assessing New Federalism." This project has
conducted numerous analyses of federalism and health policies. See Anna Kondratas, Alan Weil
& Naomi Goldstein, Assessing the New Federalism:An Introduction, 17 HEALTH AFF. 17 (1998)
(providing an introduction to the ANF project, emphasizing the need to understand state
variations to health and social service policies, and the impact of these programs on all lowincome Americans).
73. The institutional cost framework was initially described in my dissertation. Dale B.
Thompson, An Examination of the Consequences of Political, Administrative, and Legal
Institutions on the Implementation and Performance of Environmental Policies (2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author). This was later
published in the Natural Resources Journal. See Dale B. Thompson, Beyond Benefit-Cost
Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and the Regulation of Water Quality, 39 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 517 (1999).
74. Dale B. Thompson, Beyond Benefit-Cost Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and the
Regulation of Water Quality, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517, 518 (1999).
75. In my Beyond Benefit-Cost Analysis article, supra note 73, I split enforcement costs into
detection costs and prosecution costs. Id. at 534-37. However, in this Article, I refer to only
enforcement costs.
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II.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING FEDERALISM ACROSS INSTITUTIONS

A. Definitions
We begin with some definitions:
Policy:
Enactment:
Implementation:
Enforcement:
Diseconomies and
Economies of Scale:

Composed of an Enactment Phase, an
Implementation Phase, and an Enforcement Phase.
Determines goals, powers, and constraints of a
policy.
Defines mechanisms, incentives, and penalties for
those targeted by the policy.
Monitors and ensures compliance of individuals
targeted by policy.
These arise from the transaction costs of these
policies, or from the effects of transaction costs.

This framework uses a comparison of economies of scale with
diseconomies of scale. In examining economies and diseconomies of
scale, we consider institutional transaction costs. Those policies having
rising institutional transaction costs as scale increases have
diseconomies of scale, and those having lower institutional transaction
costs have economies of scale.
In comparing economies and diseconomies of scale, we can assess
the proper scale of an institutional dimension of a policy. Depending on
the relative strength of the economies and diseconomies of scale, the
cost function of a policy dimension can take different shapes:
Figure 1. Economies and Diseconomies of Scale.
COST (in $)

Case Ill

Local

State

National

Local

State

National

SCALE OF GOVERNMENT

Local

State

I

National
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In the first case, the cost of a policy is minimized by having as small
a scale as possible. This would suggest that this dimension of the policy
should be located at the local level. In the second case, minimization of
costs suggests that policy should be located at the state level. And in
the last case, minimization of costs occurs at the largest scale, so policy
should be located at the national level.
To simplify analysis, the framework presented in this Article looks at
only two levels: state and national. 76 The following describes the
general process of using this framework.
B. General Technique

1. Compare single national policy with multiple state policies that
have the same general objective [i.e. the combination of state policies
achieves the same result as the single national policy].
2. Divide into three sub-comparisons, examining policy at phases of
enactment, implementation, and enforcement.
3. At each phase, compare economies of scale with diseconomies of
scale for specific policies.
4. If economies of scale are more significant than diseconomies of
scale, then the optimal scale is national. If diseconomies are more
significant, then the optimal scale is state.
C. Factors Influencing Economies & Diseconomies of Scale

This Part will describe general factors that influence economies and
diseconomies of scale for each of the policy institutions. These factors
can then guide analysis of specific policies.
This Part begins with the enactment phase. In this phase, legislatures,
influenced by interest groups, decide to address a particular policy
problem. The legislatures then determine the ultimate purposes of the
policy, and specify available mechanisms to achieve these.
In
examining economies and diseconomies of scale for enactment, the
focus is on the legislative process and the balancing of political
interests, along with the role of interest groups. This Part also examines
financing policies through taxes, and the effects of policy errors.

76. This framework could be extended to local, regional, and international levels.
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Enactment Phase
Economies of Scale

Diseconomiesof Scale

Avoidance of replication of legislative
effort. [This advantage can be reduced by
having a leader state or a "Uniform"
approach, rather than independent
legislative efforts.]

It will be more difficult to get political
agreement, both within interest groups
and among interest groups.

Individual states may enact policies where
the costs or benefits may accrue to nonconstituents. These non-constituents may
attempt to influence the drafting of the
legislation through lobbying, or by acting
as a political entrepreneur. 77 They may
also challenge the legislation (or lack
thereof) through litigation,

A larger scale implies that the interest
groups themselves are larger, and this will
make it more difficult to get a consensus
within the group.
There will also be more interest groups
with the larger scale, and thus will be
more difficult to achieve a political
agreement.

Possible cost advantages for lobbying
when act as constituent,

It will be more difficult to enable flexible
approaches.

Avoidance of non-constituent suits.

More costly to anticipate what flexibility
is required
More difficult to achieve political
agreement on differential impacts.

Interest groups may require an
entrepreneur who will provide the public
goods of organization and information.
This is more likely to occur with larger
scale because an entrepreneur is more
likely to contribute because a larger scale
policy will have a wider impact.

Errors will be more widespread

Taxes can be collected from a broader
base, thereby reducing distortionary
effects. Also, when economic fluctuation
affects certain states harder, it can spread
the burden of supporting that state.

Opportunity for subsidized funds to be
diverted to less helpful projects, because
not bearing full cost of these funds.

Easier to experiment with smaller scale
decision-making.

77. See Dale B. Thompson, Political Entrepreneurs and Consumer Interest Groups: Theory
and Evidence from Emissions Trading (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("A political
entrepreneur recognizes that a large group of voters, who might be otherwise ignored by the
political process, may have substantial political power if they can be effectively mobilized. The
entrepreneur then tries to mobilize this group by offering it organization and information. With
the group mobilized, the entrepreneur can then direct its political power to further the
entrepreneur's own purposes.").
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From these, two considerations stand out: achieving a political
agreement to achieve the policy, and financing the policy. Scale

provides both economies and diseconomies in achieving a political
agreement, and the relative magnitudes are context dependent.
Meanwhile, the transaction costs from financing a policy generally
decline as scale increases, although increasing scale can lead to
adoption of less efficient projects, as accountability for costs declines.
This Part now turns to the implementation phase. In this phase,
administrative agencies determine the mechanism for achieving
objectives of policy. This mechanism specifies what private and public
parties must do in order to comply with the policy. In examining
economies and diseconomies of scale for implementation, this Part
focuses on the processes of implementation and experimentation, along
with the talents and knowledge base brought by the administrative staff
implementing the policy.
Implementation Phase
Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of Scale

No need for replication of effort across
states

Multiple implementations by states would
lend itself naturally to experimentation.
Furthermore, even if a centralized group
did multiple experiments, organizational
issues might create barriers to adopt
successful mechanisms for future use.

Can group talent to better understand
problem. Here, talent can be pooled from
across the country, rather than trying to
collect it in all states, or in a single state
acting as an implementation leader.

More people working on problem can
come up with wider diversity of
approaches.

A centralized implementation group will
develop a knowledge base in
implementing many policies,

Implementation might benefit from the
use of local knowledge for problems that
need locally specific mechanisms. This
local knowledge will be more available
for decentralized implementation groups.

A centralized implementation group will
have access to a broader dataset.
Easier to provide consistency in
regulations. (Even so, policies may be
subject to multiple federal agencies.)
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For implementation, there are two primary considerations:
opportunities to innovate and experiment, and the locus of knowledge.
The optimal size of a firm for enabling innovation has been the topic of
a lengthy debate. Some point to the resources available to a larger firm,
thereby enabling costly experimentation. Others point to the need for
independence to allow innovators to come up with new ideas, which is
simpler in a smaller organization.
In a similar manner, the locus of knowledge also leads to both
economies and diseconomies of scale. A project with a larger scale can
support people with more specialized knowledge. On the other hand,
projects with smaller scale imply that those involved have more
localized knowledge, and this local knowledge can aid implementation.
The final phase is enforcement. In this phase, administrative
agencies monitor compliance with the policy. Noncompliers may be
induced to comply with the policy, or may be taken to court. In
examining economies and diseconomies of scale for enforcement, we
focus on the precedent of establishing enforcement practices, and the
knowledge and abilities of enforcement agents.
Enforcement Phase
Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of Scale

More even enforcement

Decentralized agents more likely to have
local knowledge and local presence

More clear precedent if taken to court

More likely to induce compliance

Able to present a more credible
punishment threat

More receptive to locally modified
approach to compliance

Centralized savings in training
enforcement agents

As before, knowledge is also a key consideration for enforcement, in
Also, the
particular knowledge of local conditions and options.
relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity is important:
a regulated entity may be more likely to respond positively to
suggestions made by a regulator with whom a working relationship
exists. On the other hand, an external enforcement agent may be able to
induce a quicker response, as the regulated entity realizes they have few
options other than complying.
Thus, for each policy institution, these factors can be used to identify
economies and diseconomies of scale associated with a particular
policy. We can then balance the economies with the diseconomies to

2009]

Optimal Federalism Across Institutions

ascertain the appropriate scale, and thereby determine the optimal locus
of policy for each institution.
While it is helpful to consider factors affecting economies and
diseconomies of scale in general, in the end, the benefit from the
framework comes from applying it to actual policies. To better explain
how this is done, this Article will now provide some examples of how
the framework applies to specific policies. Legislators and judges can
then use these examples to apply this framework to other policies.
III. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK TO COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and its related wetlands
protection policies provide a good example of how the framework can
be used to assess the proper scale of enactment, implementation, and
enforcement institutions. As background, this part will briefly describe
how the federal government and the states currently implement these
policies. It then uses the federalism framework offered here to compare
these policies across their enactment, implementation, and enforcement
dimensions.
A. Current Federaland State Policies to ProtectEndangeredSpecies
In the United States, endangered species are protected at both the
federal and state levels. The primary legislation protecting endangered
species at the federal level is the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA).78 In order for a species to be protected under this act, it must
first be "listed" as "endangered" or "threatened" by either the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service of
the Commerce Department (NMFS).7 9 Once listed, it is illegal to "take"
a species without a federal permit. 80 "Take" under the ESA is defined
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
81
collect or attempt to engage in any such conduct."
In addition to protecting these species directly, the ESA also protects
species by designating "critical habitat" of these species. 8 2 Critical

78. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006 & West Supp. 2008).
See also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ESA BASICS: MORE THAN 30 YEARS OF PROTECTING
ENDANGERED SPECIES (2008) [hereinafter ESA BASICS], available at http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/factsheets/ESA-basics.pdf.
79. ESA BASICS, supra note 78.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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habitats are "areas that contain the physical or biological features
essential to the conservation of the species and that may need special
management or protection." 8 3 Once designated, federal agencies and
other parties operating with federal funding or under a84federal permit
must avoid "adverse modification" of the critical habitat.
Similarly to federal protection under the ESA, many states protect
endangered species under state legislation. 8 5 These laws also prohibit
taking endangered or threatened species, as designated by the state,
unless permitted by the appropriate state agency. 86 Habitat protection,
87
available under federal law, is generally not available under state law.
Consequently, the current statutory schemes for protecting
endangered species provide a parallel, overlapping structure: one at the
federal level and others at the state level. Species may be protected at
only the state level, only the federal level, or at both the federal and
state levels. Depending on the state, there may be significantly larger
numbers of species protected at the state level,8 8 and there is the
possibility that a species is protected at the federal level but not at the
state level. 89 An advantage of the dual listing structure is that it can
ensure a certain baseline level of protection: certain species will be
protected across the country, but others may be protected more or less
depending upon local conditions.
The decision to list species on a state basis is different than the
decision to list at a federal level. At the federal level, listing decisions
frequently begin when an interest group such as the Nature
Conservancy petitions to have a species protected. 90 The status of the

83.
84.

Id.
Id.

85. For example, see MINN. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., MINNESOTA'S LIST OF ENDANGERED,
THREATENED, & SPECIAL CONCERN SPECIES (2008) [hereinafter MINNESOTA ENDANGERED

SPECIES LIST], available at http://files.dnr.state.mn.us/natural-resources/ets/endlist.pdf. See also
Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.0895.
86. Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species § 84.0895.
87. Id. See also Interview with Richard Baker, Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., (Aug. 6, 2007).
88. See MINNESOTA ENDANGERED SPECIES LIST, supra note 85 (displaying Minnesota's very
lengthy list of endangered, threatened, and special concern species). Worthy of note is that only
one of fourteen mammals and three out of twenty-eight birds that are listed at the state level are
also listed at the federal level. Id. See also Interview with Richard Baker, supra note 87.
89. For example, the Canada lynx, American burying beetle, and Eskimo curlew are all
protected at the federal level and appear in Minnesota, but are not protected under Minnesota law.
See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Threatened and Endangered Species System: Minnesota,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/StateListing.do?status=listed&state=MN (last visited Mar. 5,
2009); MINNESOTA ENDANGERED SPECIES LIST, supra note 85.
90. Interview with T. J. Miller, U. S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. (Aug. 9, 2007).
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species is then assessed. 9 1 During this assessment, it is determined
whether the species is globally rare, or rare in a number of states. 9 2 An
expert scientific panel may be consulted.9 3 Then, a panel of managers
94
from the FWS may make the final listing decision.
Significant differences at the state level occur primarily due to the
more limited scope of state legislation: the state is concerned with the
presence of the species within its own territory, and not necessarily
across the country or globally. The differences in scope sometimes lead
to different decisions as to whether a particular species is listed at the
federal level, the state level, or both.
If a species is protected by both the federal ESA and a state act, then
a project that may impact that species must obtain permits from both
federal and state agencies unless it falls into one of the exceptions. 95 At
the federal level, the FWS is responsible for issuing permits. 96 One
category of permit frequently sought is an "incidental take" permit,
which applies to "taking that is incidental to an otherwise lawful
activity." 97 If a permit is issued, a limited amount of "taking" of the
species may occur, as specified by the permit. 9 8 Consequently, to
protect the species, the reviewing agency must ensure that the impact to
the species is avoided and minimized to the extent practical.
Additionally, for impacts that cannot be avoided, permit applications
must include plans for mitigation, which could include replanting of
habitat, relocating affected species, or contribution of land or funds for
99
alternative projects that address the needs of the species.
While listing and permitting decisions follow distinct processes at
state and federal levels, there is nonetheless significant coordination
between state and federal agencies. One reason for this coordination is
the fact that states maintain the databases used to assess species and
their habitats, in both listing and permitting decisions.10 0 Additionally,
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

95. One exception is that no federal permit is required if interstate commerce is not involved.
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PERMITS FOR NATIVE SPECIES: UNDER THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT (2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/factsheets/permits.pdf.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., What Is a Habitat Conservation Plan and Incidental Take
Permit?, http:H/www.fws.gov/endangered/hcp/hcpplan.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
100. For example, Minnesota operates the "Natural Heritage Information System" with
"information on Minnesota's rare plants, animals, native plant communities, and other rare
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state "biologists often have information available that is pertinent" to
beneficial when a
the specific habitat or species.' 0 ' Coordination is 1also
02
species is listed at both the federal and state level.
B. CurrentFederal and State Policies to Protect Wetlands
As with protections for endangered species, legislation protecting
wetlands is promulgated at both federal and state levels. At the federal
level, wetlands are protected through the Clean Water Act (CWA),
sections 404103 and 401;104 the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899; 1°5 the
Emergency Wetlands
Resources Act; 10 6 and the National
Environmental Policy Act. Under the CWA, the primary authority for
10 7
ensuring compliance is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
However, the CWA also designates the United States Army Corps of
10 8
Engineers (Corps) as being responsible for issuing wetlands permits.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service maintains the National Wetlands
Inventory. 109
Many states also have laws protecting wetlands. For instance,
110
Minnesota has enacted the Minnesota Wetlands Conservation Act.
This act establishes a policy of "no net loss in the quantity, quality, and
biological diversity of Minnesota's existing wetlands." 1 1 1 It also states
that activities that adversely impact wetlands should be minimized

features."
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Natural Heritage Information,
http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/eco/nhnrp/nhis.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
101. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED
SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK xxii (1998), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/
pdfs/Sec7/handbook/TOC-GLOS.PDF.
102. See Dennis Lien, St. Paul Mississippi River / Mussels Get Helping Hand, PIONEER
PRESS, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.twincities.com/minnesota/ci_6989305 (describing the
cooperative federal and state efforts to save the Higgins' eye mussels).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 404 (2006). Under Section 404, permits are required before discharging
dredge or fill material into a wetland.
104. Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (setting water quality standards, and
policies affecting wetlands must consider the effects on water quality of the particular affected
water body).
105. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2000) (regulating construction
affecting national waterways).
106. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582 (1986)
(requiring the maintenance of a National Wetlands Inventory, the responsibility for which is
given to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
107. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetland Regulatory Authority,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/reg-authority-pr.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
109. See Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986 § 401(a).
110. MINN. STAT. § 103A.201 (2008).
111. Id. § 103A.201(2)(b)(l).
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where possible, and, when it is not feasible, to "replace wetland

values." 112 In Minnesota, this legislation spreads responsibility for
protecting wetlands among the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, and wetland
permits are issued by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil
113
Resources.
Implementation of the federal legislation involves a complex network
of guidelines and rules. The EPA establishes general guidelines for
permitting in wetlands. 1 14 The Corps provides guidelines in much
greater detail. 1 15 Part of the Corps' task is to develop guidelines for
wetlands delineation, i.e. establish what areas are considered wetlands

versus

"uplands."1 16

The

Corps

has

also

developed

a

"hydrogeomorphic classification system-a state-of-the-art method for
evaluating ecological functions of wetlands."1 17 This system allows the

Corps

to develop regionally

specific

guidelines

for

assessing

wetlands. 1 18 This system is consistent with the significant degree of
1 19
independence of one district office of the Corps from another.
Additionally, the Corps has established a "Nationwide Permit"

program, 120 whereby certain categories of activities in designated
areas 12 1 may qualify for a permit without undergoing a full permit

application and review process.
Furthermore, the Corps frequently coordinates with state agencies
responsible for protecting wetlands. 12 2 Under section 404, part F, of the
112. Id. § 103A.201(2)(b)(4).
113. See
Minnesota
Pollution
Control
Agency,
Wetlands
in
Minnesota,
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/water/wetlands/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
114. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 230 (2008). In particular, see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2008).
115. See generally 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-336 (2008). In particular, see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (2008).
116. Interagency Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Wetlands Determinations for
Purposes of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Subtitle B of the Food Security Act, 59 Fed.
Reg. 2920 (Jan. 19, 1994).
117. U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Wetlands Management,
http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/factsheets/wetland.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). For a description
of this system, see National Action Plan to Develop the Hydrogeomorphic Approach for
Assessing Wetland Functions, 61 Fed. Reg. 42593 (Aug. 16, 1996).
118. There are numerous regional guidebooks explaining the application of this system. For a
list of these publications, see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wetland Publications,
http://el.erdc.usace.army.miliwetlands/wlpubs.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
119. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2008) ("The Corps is a highly decentralized organization.");
Telephone Interview with Susan Elston, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Region V (September 18,
2007).
120. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1 (2008).
121. Water bodies noted as "critical resource waters" are not included in certain parts of this
program. Id.
122. Interview with David Weirens, Minnesota Bd. of Water & Soil Res. (August 1, 2007).

460
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Clean Water Act, when someone applies for and receives a state
wetlands permit, they may be entitled to an exemption from a federal
permit requirements. Accordingly, it is essential for the Corps and
relevant state agencies to coordinate in establishing consistent permit
guidelines. As a result, another set of guidelines established by the
Corps in coordination with state agencies are guidelines for
124
mitigation,12 3 including mitigation banks.
In addition to these rules, both the EPA 125 and the Corps have centers
for conducting experiments related to wetlands. The Corps facility is
known as the Waterways Experiment Station and is located in
26
Vicksburg, Mississippi.1
At the same time, state agencies also develop locally appropriate
guidelines for managing wetlands. Minnesota's Wetland Conservation
Plan states, "Local water plans, wetlands plans, and land use plans
remain the best way to account for specific local needs and
conditions."' 127
In Minnesota, management strategy begins by
identifying and describing differences across hydrogeologic zones in the
state. 128 For each of the zones, appropriate management techniques are
specified. State agencies use these management strategies to develop
"general and specific standards that apply to the evaluation of permits
29
for each type of activity." 1
Additionally, as noted above, mitigation guidelines are developed in
coordination with federal agencies.
However, while the federal
government maintains experimental labs for wetlands, it is less likely
that states will do so.130

123. See, e.g., Interagency Memorandum of Understanding: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers &
Minnesota Board of Water & Soil Resources, Wetland Mitigation Guidelines (May 20, 2007),
http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/wetlands/BWSR-COEmemo.pdf
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009)
[hereinafter BWSR / USACE Interagency Memorandum of Understanding on Wetland
Mitigation].
124. Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed.
Reg. 58605-02 (Nov. 28, 1995).
125. Interview with Susan Elston, supra note 119.
126. Waterways Experiment Station, http://www.wes.army.mil/Welcome.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2009) (housing a wide array of experiments). The wetlands center is known as the
Wetlands Research and Technology Center.
Wetlands Research Technology Center,
http://el.erdc.usace.army.millwetlands/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
127. MINN. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., MINNESOTA WETLANDS CONSERVATION PLAN,
VERSION 1.0, at 27 (1997), available at http:llfiles.dnr.state.mn.usleco/wetlands/wetland.pdf.
128. Id.
129. MINN. BD. OF WATER AND SOIL RES., WETLANDS REGULATION IN MINNESOTA 7
(2003), available at http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/wetlands/publicationslMNRegulaions.pdf. See
also MINN. R. 6115.0190-.0232, .0270-.0280.
130. Interview with David Weirens, supra note 122.
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In the enforcement phase of wetlands policy, local, state, and federal
agencies make decisions about granting permits, and these decisions
may be appealed. Permits satisfying the requirements of the Clean
Water Act are generally issued by the Corps, although a state agency
may also be granted authority under certain circumstances. 13 1 In
general, permitting decisions by the Corps are made by district
engineers. 132 Substantive appeals of these decisions may be submitted
to a division engineer, while further appeals are handled under the
133
Administrative Procedures Act.
At the state level, initial permitting decisions may be made by local
134
governmental units, such as county boards or by state agency staff.
Appeals made by agency staff may be made to the heads of
commissions, or beyond that, to courts under state administrative law
procedures. 135 Meanwhile, appeals of local government units can
generally be made to the state agency that oversees136the process under
which the local government unit manages wetlands.
C. Policy Comparison
Under the federalism framework offered in this Article, we select a
particular goal to achieve, and then consider economies and
diseconomies of scale associated with that goal, across different
institutions. The goal of the first policy will be to protect the habitat of
species listed as endangered or threatened. This goal will provide its
principal benefits to citizens across the country, through gains from
maintaining biodiversity and existence values. 137 The goal of the
second policy will be to preserve wetlands located near major water
bodies. This goal will provide its principal benefits to local and
regional citizens who are affected by these water bodies. Wetland
protection will improve the water quality, and also serve as a buffer in
case of overflow and flooding. Some of these Water bodies are intra-

131. Interview with Doug Norris, Minn. Dep't of Natural Res. (August 7, 2007); Interview
with Susan Elston, supra note 119. For example, one state whose agency has authority to issue
permits is Michigan.
132. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 331 (2008).
133. Id. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2000).
134. See MINNESOTA BOARD OF WATER AND SOIL RESOURCES, supra note 129.
135. Id.
136. Id.; Interview with Doug Norris, supra note 131.
137. Existence value is "the value someone derives from knowing that a resource exists."
Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts' Struggles with Natural Resource
Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57, 58 n.3 (2002).
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state, while others cross many states. We now compare these policies
across their enactment, implementation, and enforcement dimensions.
1. Enactment
In analyzing economies and diseconomies of scale during enactment,
we examine the transaction costs of legislatures, interest groups, and
political entrepreneurs. Some of the key aspects are the scope of the
benefits and costs. As noted, an endangered species policy provides
benefits to citizens across the country. These benefits are very diffuse
and not well-understood by many citizens. As a result, a political
entrepreneur may be needed to champion the cause of protecting
endangered species. 138 There are significant economies of scale to the
activities of these entrepreneurs, because their provision of information
and organization can be done at a national level, rather than over
multiple, separate state levels.
However, in order to preserve the habitat of the endangered species,
development opportunities in the habitat location will need to be
curtailed. This will impose more concentrated costs on the locality in
which the species's habitat is located. Consequently, there might be a
need to compensate affected owners of property on which the habitat
lies. A broader tax base should lower distortionary effects of this tax,
139
and so there is an economy of scale here.
In contrast, the benefits from a wetlands policy will accrue to those
citizens located near affected hydrogeological systems. As a result, for
systems contained completely within one state, it is more likely that
those beneficiaries can be more effectively represented at a state level,
and so the economies of scale are less here than for the endangered
species policy. Additionally, in the end, the interest groups supporting a
wetlands policy will be a coalition of groups impacted by water quality
and flood-control effects located in different areas. Because this will be
a coalition, it may be more difficult to coordinate these groups if they
are impacted differently by wetlands policies. This effect is one of
diseconomies of scale.
However, to a great extent, most hydrogeological systems are
interconnected.14 0
As a result, in the case of multi-state
hydrogeological systems, beneficiaries exist at a more regional-level. In
these instances, in order to enact policies at the state level, regional
138. In my previous article, I split enforcement costs into detection costs and prosecution
costs. However, in this Article, I refer to only enforcement costs.
139. See infra note 179.
140. Interview with Doug Norris, supra note 131.
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compacts between the states sharing the water body would be necessary.

Such compacts for water policies are currently in force addressing the
Great Lakes and the Colorado River.
Other economies of scale remain, as duplicative legislative efforts
could make state enactment of a wetlands policy costly.

These

duplicative efforts could be avoided by a "Uniform" approach, however.
The following table summarizes economies and diseconomies of scale
in enactment:
Wetlands

Endangered Species
Economies of Scale

Avoid duplicative
legislative efforts

Diseconomies of
Scale

Can have one state
lead, or have
consortium of

Economies of Scale

Similar economy

Diseconomies of
Scale

Similar
diseconomy

states as leader.

Easier to explain
benefits of
wetlands (flood
control, water
quality) to
localities where
water bodies are
present.

May be easier to
organize at national
level because
benefits of policy
are more esoteric:
the welfare of
different
endangered species
in an area provide
benefits through
biodiversity, the
balance of an
ecosystem, 141 and
as a proxy for the
health of the42 local
ecosystem1
(economies of scale
of a political
entrepreneur)
Endangered species
interest groups are
more willing to
support national

To properly
address effects of
wetlands that
service multi-state

Also may have
localized benefits:
benefits of policy
for an entirely local

policies because

hydrogeologic

hydrogeologic

141. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 8ERV., ESA BASICS:MORE THAN 30 YEARS OF CONSERVING
ENDANGERED SPECIES (2008), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/factsheets/ESA-basics.pdf (last

visited Jan. 25, 2008).
142. See interview with Richard Baker, supra note 87, interview with T. J. Miller, supra note
90.
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impact of policies
rises at an
increasing rate as
scale increases.
(survival rate of
species increases
exponentially as
additional habitats
are protected, and
hence are less
subject to having
entire species
exposed to
individual external
shocks)
Easier to manage
national
environmental
groups than fifty
individual state
environmental
groups, because of
the wide range of
organizational
strength of
environmental
groups across
143
different states
Can reduce the
impact of antiendangeredspecies-protection
interest groups that
are more influential
in a small number
of specific states.

i

systems, it is much
easier to legislate at
the national level:
simplification of
coordination (if
done at state level,
the legislature must
direct that effects
on other states are
considered, and
this must be done
through reciprocity
negotiations of
neighboring
legislatures / state
compacts)
Similar economy

[Vol. 40
system flow to
local residents. If
so, local
legislatures may be
better in-tune with
true value of
wetland protection
for that body of
water.

Similar economy

Thus, under this framework, one looks for the lowest cost way to
enact a particular policy. As seen in the table above, for a given
endangered species policy, groups wishing to politically support this
policy would encounter economies of scale, while groups opposing this
policy would have greater strength at state levels. Although of a
different nature, there are also significant economies of scale for
policies that protect multi-state hydrogeologic wetland systems. It is

143.

See interview with Richard Baker, supra note 87.
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simpler to coordinate efforts through a single piece of legislation rather
than multiple pieces of legislation in different legislatures. In marked
contrast, there are considerably fewer economies of scale for a local
wetlands policy. Many of the benefits of local wetlands are captured
locally, and hence can be properly assimilated in a political "who-bearscosts versus who-benefits" battle within a state.
In the end, the framework therefore suggests that policies protecting
endangered species and multi-state hydrogeologic wetland systems are
relatively less costly to enact at the federal level, while policies
protecting local wetlands are better candidates for enactment by
individual states.
2. Implementation
In the enactment phase, policy goals are defined.
During
implementation, an administrative agency develops rules to achieve
these policy goals. During enforcement, these rules are applied in
particular cases, and then are monitored to ensure compliance.
Both endangered species and wetlands policies are fundamentally
about land use and development decisions.
Consequently, the
implementation phase of these policies can be understood as an
agency's attempt to develop rules protecting endangered species and
wetlands while balancing land use and development interests. Rules
that need to be developed for endangered species include determination
of what species are "listed," and development of mitigation guidelines.
For wetlands, rule development includes scientific assessment and
designation of critical waters, development of scientific approaches to
categorizing wetlands, development of mitigation guidelines, and
determination of appropriate management strategies.
In comparing economies and diseconomies of scale for
implementation, we focus on the process of writing rules and
guidelines; baseline protection; database management; and both local
and centrally developed knowledge. We find the following economies
and diseconomies:
Endangered Species
Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of

Wetlands
Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of

Similar duplication
avoidance for rules
of mitigation
guidelines. To a

Similar opportunity
for use of
"Uniform" method
for mitigation

Scale

Avoid costs of
duplication for
developing lists of
protected species

Could approach
this on a state
level using a
"Uniform"

Scale

466

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

(although not
necessary to address
species that are not
present in a state,
and hence there
may be less
overlap) and rules
for mitigation
guidelines
Can more easily
assure that there are
baseline protections
for particular
species.' 4
Also, can
coordinate rule
development for
multi-state
species. 45

Development of
listing decisions
requires databases
of information on
species and their
habitats.
Significant
economies in
coordinating
databases of species
residing in multiple
state jurisdictions,
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method, thereby
also avoiding
duplication costs

lesser extent,
avoidance of
duplication of
designation of
multi-state critical
resource waters,

guidelines.
Designation of
critical resource
waters contained
within one state
would not involve
replication in other
jurisdictions.

Knowledge of
local conditions
may be needed in
particular cases
for making listing
decisions and in
developing
mitigation
guidelines. More
likely that this
information is
possessed by local
staff. 146
Record structure
of database may
need to be
inconsistent from
one jurisdiction to
another
jurisdiction,
because local
circumstances
may lead to need
to collect different
information in
different places.

Similar economy,
whereby we can
assure baseline
protection for
wetlands impacting
multi-state
hydrogeologic
systems. 41 7 Can
also coordinate
rule development
for multi-state
hydrogeologic
systems.
Need to coordinate
collection of
National Wetland
Inventory.

Similar
diseconomy, in
particular with
determining locally
appropriate regional
management
strategies for
wetlands.

Diseconomies of

Difficult to collect
all of this
information in
centralized manner.
Easier to allow
decision-makers to
evaluate wetlands to
be measured, and
characteristics to be
analyzed (i.e. what
do you need to
know to ascertain
the "quality" and
"quantity" of the

144. Id.
145. Interview with T. J. Miller, supra note 90.
146. Id.

147. Interview with Doug Norris, supra note 131; Interview with Susan Elston, supra note
119.
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centralized data
collection from
managing data of
different record
structures. Also
diseconomy from
managing large

wetland?).

amount of

information about
all critical species

across the
nation.
Can support
research through
centralized grant
system.

4s

Conduct wetlands
research through
national
laboratories,
Establish general

Much easier to
adapt these models
to local conditions
with local
information.

scientific approach
to modeling
wetlands that

enables adjustment
for regionally

specific guidelines
for assessing
wetlands.

In this case, one can see significant economies and diseconomies of
scale for implementing policies protecting both endangered species and
wetlands. There is a critical need for baseline protection, an economy
of scale; while at the same time, determination of the appropriate level
of additional protection depends on knowledge of local conditions, a
diseconomy of scale. There are economies of scale in coordinating
protection of multi-state species and wetland systems, but diseconomies
in collecting and managing data needed to make implementation
decisions. In comparison, wetland protection offers a strong economy
of scale in the opportunity to conduct research on wetlands through a
national laboratory.
In the end, the existence of both economies and diseconomies of
scale suggests that implementation of these policies should be

148. See Interview with Richard Baker, supra note 87.
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performed at both the state and federal levels. Federal implementation
should focus on establishing baseline protection, coordinating rule
development for multi-state species and wetlands, and, in the case of
wetlands, conducting primary research at a national laboratory. At the
same time, states should be responsible for determining rules for
protection beyond baselines, and for collecting and managing data for
protecting species and wetlands.
3. Enforcement
As mentioned above, enforcement involves applying rules to
particular cases, and monitoring to ensure compliance. For endangered
species, implementing agencies develop rules about which species and
which habitats are protected. In enforcement, these rules are applied to
individual permits. In this process, agencies must determine whether
any taking of a protected species is justified, and if so, they must ensure
that the taking is minimized. The agencies also assess the need for
mitigation. Additionally, agencies must monitor projects to ensure that
they are complying with the terms of their permits.
Meanwhile, enforcing wetlands protections likewise involves
applying rules to individual permit applications. This process may
involve assessment of the wetland itself, as well as the effect on the
wetland, and may also include mitigation actions. Permit decisions may
be appealed.
To examine economies and diseconomies in enforcement, we again
must consider baseline protection and the role of information. We also
need to look at the number of staff needed to enforce policies;
coordination of mitigation projects; and the advantages and
disadvantages of external enforcement agents. In comparing these
policies, we see the following economies and diseconomies of scale:
Endangered Species
Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of
Scale

Oversight may be
needed to ensure
baseline protections
of species. This can

Issuing permits and
monitoring
compliance
requires large

be achieved through

numbers of people,

Wetlands
Economies of
Scale

Similar
economy.

Diseconomies of
Scale

Similar
diseconomy, to a
greater extent
because the
number of wetland
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"memoranda of
49
understanding,"'
coordinating initial
permitting decisions
by state agents,
followed by routine
approval by federal
agents.

52
Similar economy. 1

and there are
diseconomies of
managing larger
numbers of people.
Meanwhile, state
agencies can utilize
large numbers of
staff who have a
number of other
responsibilities in
addition to species
150
protection.
Local information
is important in
assessing the
effects on the
species, the value
of the project
proposed, and the
usefulness or
proposed
mitigation. State
agents are more
likely to have local
53
information.

permits tends to be
significantly higher
than the number of
species permits.'

Federal
personnel can act
as "gorilla in the
closet": they are
less likely to be
influenced by
local
154
politicians,
and as a result, it
is less likely that
additional
appeals (and
hence
transaction
costs) would be
necessary for a
given wetlands
project that
could be

Similar
55

diseconomy.1
In some instances,
it may be easier for
local enforcement
agents to convince
affected parties to
comply with a
permitting
56
decision.

149. See BWSR / USACE Interagency Memorandum of Understanding on Wetland
Mitigation, supra note 123.
150. See Interview with Richard Baker, supra note 87; Interview with T. J. Miller, supra note
90.
151. Interview with Doug Norris, supra note 136; Interview with Susan Elston, supra note
119.
152. Interview with T. J. Miller, supra note 90.
153. See Interview with Richard Baker, supra note 87; Interview with T. J. Miller, supra note
90.
154. Id.
155. Interview with Susan Elston, supra note 119.
156. Interview with Mark Gemes, Minn. Pollution Control Agency (July 31, 2007).
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considered
detrimental, but
nonetheless
could win
approval.
Large advantages in
coordinating
mitigation projects
across state lines. 157

It may be easier to
negotiate
reciprocity in
mitigation projects
for species that
cross borders,
because border
crossing by
endangered species
normally takes
place in both

In multi-state
system
situations, it will
be easier to
centrally
coordinate
mitigation
projects, rather
than negotiate
for reciprocity
between states.

directions.

This is due to the
direction of flow
limiting the

opportunities for
reciprocity.

In comparing enforcement of these policies, we see a significant
number of similarities, with some differences. For both policies, there
are substantial diseconomies of scale in initially processing permit
applications and later in monitoring. This is true both in managing the
people performing these tasks, and in the availability of local
information. This diseconomy is more significant for wetlands due to
the higher number of wetland permits. Another similarity is the
usefulness of the "gorilla in the closet," which is an economy of scale.
There are also economies of scale in coordinating multi-state mitigation
projects. The current overlapping permitting system coordinated
through memoranda of understanding between federal and state
agencies is a method to capture both economies and diseconomies of
scale in enforcement.
In the end, the significant diseconomies of scale for enforcement of
both endangered species policies and wetland protection policies
suggest that both of these policies should be enforced primarily at the
state level. Federal enforcement should have a supporting role,

157. Interview with T. J. Miller, surpa note 90.
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addressing the need to coordinate multi-state mitigation projects, and to
provide oversight in order to ensure baseline protections.
IV. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE HEALTH CARE POLICY
This Part begins with a description of the Medicaid program. It then
explains Medicaid's policy goals, and after that, compares the
economies and diseconomies of scale across each policy institution.
A. The MedicaidProgram
Through Medicaid, states receive federal assistance to finance health
insurance plans designed to serve low-income pregnant women,
families with children, the elderly, and the disabled. 15 8 Medicaid was
initially created by federal legislation in 1965.159 Under traditional
Medicaid, a state can apply for federal matching dollars (ranging from
fifty percent to a maximum of eighty-three percent, depending upon the
state) 160 to support its expenditures on medical assistance for certain
low-income groups. To qualify for the matching dollars, state plans
have to meet certain requirements. Certain services must be provided
by these plans. These "benefits extend well into the realm of long-term
care and include such interventions as personal care services, respite
care, home care adaptation and case management."' 16 1 These plans must
reflect "freedom of choice," whereby an individual beneficiary of the
plan could choose to receive care from any provider. 16 2 Another
of benefits across a state, also known as
requirement is uniformity
"statewideness."' 163 Furthermore, the state has to limit beneficiaries to
certain protected low-income groups: pregnant women, families with
children, the elderly, and the disabled. 16 4 Federal legislation also

158. 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2007) ("Federal grants to States for medical assistance to low-income
persons who are age 65 or over, blind, disabled, or members of families with dependent children
or qualified pregnant women or children").
159. The Social Security Act tit. XIX (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
160. This share is called the "federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP)." ELICIA J.
HERZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MEDICAID: A PRIMER CRS-6 (2005), available at

https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/2676/RL33202_20051222.pdf.
161. Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7,
13(2001).
162. See HERZ, supra note 160, at CRS-4 ("With certain exceptions, beneficiaries must have
freedom of choice among health care providers or managed care entities participating in
Medicaid.").
163. See id. at CRS-3 (stating that "the amount, duration, and scope of benefits must be the
same statewide" and labeling this requirement the "statewideness rule").
164. See id. at CRS-2 to CRS-3 (discussing certain groups that the states "may choose to
cover," as opposed to "must" cover).
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mandates coverage for certain income levels of some of these groups;
for instance, "pregnant women, infants, and children up to age 6 with
family incomes up to 133 percent of the [federal poverty level
(FPL)]. ' 165 States could sometimes extend coverage to higher income
levels for these groups. However, once these income levels are
determined, anyone who falls within these protected groups and meets
1 66
income requirements is entitled to receive benefits.
In 1981, states were given the opportunity to seek waivers from some
of these requirements. The most flexible waiver came under section
1115,167 and it allowed states to seek waivers to continue to receive
matching funds to support a "research and demonstration" plan. Under
these plans, freedom of choice could be limited, uniformity was not
required, and managed care could be applied. 16 8
Additionally,
"Managed Care/Freedom of Choice Waivers" can also be obtained
under section 1915(b), and "Home and Community-Based Services
16 9
Waivers" under section 1915(c).
For a time, eligibility for Medicaid depended upon an individual's
receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or
Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
However, under the 1996
Welfare Reform Act, the previous requirement of receipt of AFDC
benefits was removed (AFDC itself was replaced by Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families, TANF). With the passage of the 1996
Welfare Reform Act, section 1931 gave additional flexibility to the
states in determining income eligibility with respect to whether certain
income and assets would apply. A consequence of this was the ability
to expand coverage to working parents. 170 Under this section, states can
17 1
also utilize managed care programs without seeking a waiver.

165. John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, Leaders and Laggards in State Coverage Expansions,
in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 72, at 179, 181.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000 & West Supp. 2008), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-275, §
111(a); Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 7001(d)(2)(A), 7001(d)(2)(B), 7001(d)(2)(C), 7001(d)(4), 122
Stat. 2304.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2000 & West Supp. 2008). Under this waiver, a state can require
beneficiaries to enroll in a managed care plan. Both of these waivers were created under the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2175, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
169. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERV., MEDICAID STATE WAIVER PROGRAM
DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS-GENERAL
INFORMATION
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/
("Section
1915(b)
Managed
Care/Freedom of Choice Waivers ....
Section 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Service
Waivers ... ").
170. See CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, TAKING THE NEXT STEP: STATES CAN
Now TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FEDERAL MEDICAID MATCHING FUNDS TO EXPAND HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE TO
LOW-INCOME WORKING PARENTS passim (1998),
available at
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B. Goals

The Medicaid policy considered in this Article will achieve various
goals. First, eligibility for medical benefits for a particular group, such
as children, should be extended to include higher income levels.
Second, total state expenditures should remain the same, and
consequently, expansion of coverage would have to be balanced by
savings in expenditures elsewhere. To achieve these savings, existing
beneficiaries would be moved into a managed care plan (or MCO,
which it is assumed would entail lower costs per beneficiary for the
same level of services).
C. Enactment
As it currently stands, the enactment process of Medicaid is
performed by legislatures at both the federal and the state level.
Congress enacted the initial Medicaid legislation and provided federal
17 2
financial support to state plans that met statutory requirements.
Subsequent amendments have provided additional flexibility for states
173
receiving federal financial support.
Meanwhile, authorization of state plans requires legislation enacted
by states. The following is a brief description of the different steps that
would be necessary to achieve the goals specified above.
The
legislature would make certain decisions: Would these plans be
"mandatory or voluntary?"' 174 What services would be included? 175
Would the coverage area be state-wide, or a specific region? Would a
state agency "promulgate[] rates" for the managed care plan, or "invite[]
competitive bids?" 17 6 Exactly what income levels would make each

http://www.cbpp.org/8-20-98mcaid.pdf ("[T]he federal welfare law enacted in August 1996
contains a little-recognized opportunity for states to expand coverage to poor and near-poor
working parents through Medicaid."). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1 (2000 & West Supp. 2008)

("Assuring coverage for certain low-income families.").
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (2000 & West Supp. 2008) (permitting states to require
individuals who are eligible for medical assistance to enroll in a managed care entity).
172. Interview with T. J. Miller, supra note 90.
173. See supra Part II.A (discussing current federal and state policies to protect endangered
species).
174.

AM. ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES,

MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: SAVINGS, ACCESS AND

QUALITY 11 (1996) [hereinafter ACTUARIES REPORT], available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/
health/medicare.pdf.
175. Federal requirements include a number of services as mandatory, while others are
optional. For examples of mandatory and optional benefits, see HERZ, supra note 160, at CRS-3
to CRS-4 (discussing mandatory benefits such as inpatient hospital services and laboratory and xray services, and optional benefits such as prescribed drugs and routine dental care).
176. ACTUARIES REPORT, supra note 174, at 11.
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protected group eligible for coverage? These changes would then be
embodied in state legislation authorizing development of a new (or

amended) plan.
In drafting this legislation, state agencies would work closely with
the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS,
formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)]1 77 to
to
ascertain which federal Medicaid statutes would enable the state 178

recover matching federal dollars to help finance these plans.

Eventually, the plan must be submitted to CMS for approval, which will

determine whether the state plan or state plan amendment conforms to
statutory requirements necessary to receive federal matching support.
From this process, one can identify certain economies and
diseconomies of scale, as noted in the following table. In examining
these, this section focuses on financing these programs and consequent

incentives, benefit provisions, and opportunities for experimentation.
Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of Scale

These programs can be funded through

There may be less incentive to use this

taxation at the national level, and with

funding appropriately, if the localities

17 9
less distortion under a larger tax base.

spending these monies do not utilize their

Also, coverage for low income groups
may be difficult to finance in states with

own funds for these programs. ["Medicaid
8
Maximization"] ' '

177. More specifically the Center for Medicaid and State Operations within the CMS.
178. Telephone interview with Peggy Clark, Bruce R. Johnson, Gerald Zelinger, staff
members, and Donna Schmidt, director of the Div. of Benefits, Eligibility and Managed Care
from the Family & Children's Health Programs Group, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Baltimore, Md. (Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Staff Interview].
179. See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE
PRICE SYSTEM 331-33 (4th ed. 1994) (examining "labor supply distortion of the income tax" and
welfare costs). Also, recall that prior to passage of the Medicaid Act in 1965, which was part of
the "Great Society" legislation package of Lyndon B. Johnson, responsibility for low-income
However, these
health care was traditionally placed on hospitals, counties, and states.
responsibilities put severe stresses on states and counties, and so Congress was lobbied for over
thirty years to provide federal assistance for low-income medical services. See Kevin C. Fleming
et al., A Culturaland Economic History of Old Age in America, 78 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS
914, 917 (2003), available at http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.com/content/787/914.full
.pdf+html?sid=3d6e3d3e-f90f-406e-a38b-f60f71b04b82 ("Hospitals increasingly bore the brunt
of unpaid health expenses for older people, which came to be viewed as a threat to their
existence."). This history also demonstrates the relevance of the economy of scale for financing
Medicaid.
180. This is because, with large proportions of low income groups, these states will have a
smaller tax base on which to draw to fund this program.
181. "Medicaid maximization" is the "practice of implementing Medicaid policies designed to
expand federal financing." Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, States' Strategies for
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180
high proportions of these groups.
Consistency of benefits: ensure that
baseline services are provided. 82

Some states may have less need for certain
services.18 3 Local legislators can better
assess when this is the case.
May need to target individual regions of
states, or a particular population. 184
Again, local legislators can better assess
when this is the case.
Allows more experimentation in
alternative approaches. 8 5

Examining these, there are two principal effects relating to
enactment: the economies of a larger tax base versus the diseconomies
of specifying exactly which services, regions, and populations would be
covered under a policy. The current process of enactment at both the
federal and state levels enables Medicaid policy to benefit from-both the
tax economy of scale by allowing some funding of the programs at the
federal level, and also from the flexibility of diseconomy by allowing
states to tailor their programs to their needs. Enactment by individual
states also permits state plans to serve as "laboratories of democracy."
However, this comparison also suggests that the federal financial
support of state Medicaid programs should be designed in a manner to
reduce the incidence of "Medicaid Maximization" behavior, and also to
ensure the delivery of baseline services.
D. Implementation
After this legislation has been enacted, the principal task will then
turn to the agencies for implementation. Implementing a Medicaid
policy begins when a state agency seeks a health plan to provide
coverage for beneficiaries in particular areas. As noted above, this can
be done either by seeking competitive bids, or by setting rates for
Tapping Federal Revenues: Implications and Consequences of Medicaid Maximization, in
FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 72, at 145.
182. "[T]he current federal-state system of health insurance provides a base of... coverage
to the neediest populations. The federal mandates regarding populations and services covered
ensure that this base will remain in place." Alan Weil et al., Improving the Federal System of
Health Care Coverage, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 72, at 399, 401.
183. See Staff Interview, supra note 178.
184. See ACTUARIES REPORT, supra note 174, at 12 ("[A] Medicaid risk program can be put
in place statewide, or introduced as pilot programs set up in specific areas.").
185. See ANDY SCHNEIDER, THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 132 (2002), available at

http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2236-index.cfm

[hereinafter

YELLOW

BOOK]

developed innovative and unique responses to these myriad challenges .... ").

("States

have
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provided services followed by selecting a plan or plans at those rates.1 86
When utilizing a managed care plan, these rates are known as
"capitation" rates. Capitation rates are a per-person ("per head") fee
that the health plan receives to provide services for the covered
population. It is out of this payment that the plan itself must pay its
own providers. This is in contrast to a "fee-for-services" approach,
whereby a plan is paid for each service actually delivered.
The capitation rate approach shifts the risk of the cost of delivering
health services to the health plan: 187 if participants demand health
services of greater cost than covered by the capitation payments, then
the health plan will lose money. This possibility provides an incentive
for health plans to proactively manage the provision of health care for
their participants, so that earlier, less-costly preventive care is
encouraged to reduce the costs of later treatment.
After a health plan has been selected, additional negotiation is
necessary to draft the contractual agreement between the state and the
health plan. 18 8 This contract will specify exactly what services must be
provided. It will also use terminology appropriate to the locality being

served. 189
One aspect of this negotiation will be to determine which services
should be "carved out" of the capitation payment. 190 As noted above,
the risk for providing services for patients will be transferred to
managed care plans.
Sometimes these risks are extremely high,
depending on what service is provided, such as mental health care or
substance abuse programs. To reduce these risks for the plan, these
services may be "carved out", whereby the payment the plan receives
for their provision is not through the capitation payment, but instead is
done on a fee-for-service basis.

186. See id. at 139 ("Medicaid managed care takes two forms: primary care case management
(PCCM) and managed care organizations (MCOs). Under the PCCM approach, providers are
paid on a fee-for-service basis ....

Under the MCO approach, beneficiaries are enrolled in an

MCO that receives a monthly capitation payment from the state Medicaid agency .... ").
187. See Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid and Managed Care
(1995), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2043-managed.cfm ("The contractor assumes
the financial risk of providing all of the medically necessary services under the contract (the
contractor will often reinsure against the risk of high-cost cases).").
188.

For a sample contract, see MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERV.,

2009 FAMILIES AND

CHILDREN CONTRACT FINAL MODEL (2009) [hereinafter MINNESOTA CONTRACT], available at

http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/healthcare/documents/pub/dhs-id-054907.pdf.
189. See Staff Interview, supra note 178.
190. See YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 141, 165 (discussing that state agencies determine

which services will be covered under the capitation plan).
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Other factors arising during these contract negotiations include
developing standards to assure the quality of care provided; determining
methods for monitoring the plans to ensure that these standards are met;
and developing database structures for services provided for
Focusing on the knowledge embedded in
participants. 19 1
implementation staff, the following are economies and diseconomies of
scale from implementing this health care policy:
Economies of Scale

Can have model contract,
applicable to all states.

Diseconomies of Scale
Less knowledge of plans to serve as contracting
partners. This -is significant in first finding plans,
and then in working out details of the contract.
Difference in local knowledge of providers, and their
rates (essential for doing bids, setting contract rates)
Difference in language of provided services, by
locality. 192 Hence, model contract may not be
appropriate depending on differential language.
Determining what services will need to be "carved
out" depends on knowledge of local beneficiary
base, and operation of local health care provision.

Examining these, it is clear that there are significant diseconomies of
scale for implementing a Medicaid plan. Local knowledge about plans
and providers is essential in setting rates and negotiating the contract. It
is also essential to ascertain when it is appropriate to carve out certain
services. As a result, implementation of a Medicaid program at a state
level seems clearly preferable.
E. Enforcement

After contracting with the managed care plan, the state agency then
needs to enroll beneficiaries in the plan. To better enroll beneficiaries,
Once
the agency must educate them about the opportunities.' 93
of
beneficiaries are enrolled in plans, there are additional steps
194
investigating the quality of care provided, and handling appeals.

191.
192.
193.

See MINNESOTA CONTRACT, supra note 188 passim (providing a model contract).
Staff Interview, supra note 178.
See ACTUARIES REPORT, supra note 174, at 12-13 ("The state Medicaid agency and the

health plans need to help both [providers and beneficiary communities] understand the benefits of
applying managed care to the Medicaid program.").
194. See State of Minn. Office of the Ombudsman for Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities, Who's Who in the Health Care System: A Resource Guide for Minnesotans (2008),
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The plans report data on service utilization by their enrollees. 195 This
data is known as "encounter data." The states then must process this
data, and submit additional data to the federal government. This data is
used to assess conformity of the state's plan with federal
requirements. 196 The federal government also conducts audits of both
the state and their health plan partners, to ensure compliance with Title
XIX. 197 Additionally, payments are processed based on this data. 198
These payments are made to providers, plans, and the states themselves,
through the federal matching grant. One
concern that may arise is with
199
respect to "Medicaid Maximization."
Furthermore, this encounter data is used to determine the sufficiency
of the capitation payments to the plans. 200 The capitation rates are
based on a predicted level of service utilization by enrollees; however,
the plans may end up serving populations requiring higher levels of
services. Since federal legislation requires payments to plans to be
"actuarially sound," adjustments to capitation rates must be made based
on actual use. 20 1 There is a cap to these adjustments, however:
capitation payments cannot exceed the "upper 20
payment
limit" applied to
2
a fee-for-service delivery of the same services.
In this case, economies and diseconomies relate to economies of
scope, data management, and knowledge:

available
at
http://www.ombudmhdd.state.mn.us/who/default.htm
(discussing
the
grievance/complaint and appeals process). See also YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 133
("reviewing the quality of care in managed care organizations").
195. See YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 133.
196. Staff Interview, supra note 178.

197. See YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 134-37 (discussing the federal and state
responsibilities of the jointly administered Medicaid program).
198. See id. at 135, 142 (examining the systems for payment processing).
199. See id. at 134 (describing the "guaranteed tension" between states and the federal
government).
200. Interview with George Hoffman and Shawn Welch, Staff Members, State of Minn. Dep't

of Human Serv. (August 14, 2007) [hereinafter Hoffman-Welch Interview].
201. Id. See also YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185 at 142 ("While there are no federal 'public
process' requirements ... the federal Medicaid statute does require that MCOs be paid on an

'actuarially sound basis."').
202. See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PAYMENT METHODS AND

CAPITATION

RATES:

RESULTS

OF

A

NATIONAL

SURVEY

3

(1999),

available at

http://www.urban.org/publications/309064.html ("[S]tates content that they are limited by the

'upper payment limit' which restricts their ability to pay more than fee-for-service expenditures
for comparable populations."). See also YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 141-42 ("subject to

the fee-for-service upper payment limit, which CMS has specified in regulation").
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Economies of Scale

Diseconomies of Scale
Economies of scope in enrollment, and
appeals: services already provided by other
state agencies. 0 3 Also, more experience in
working with particular groups.

There are some areas where data
should be consistent across states. 2°4
Oversight of data is also needed to
protect against Medicaid
Maximization.

Encounter data suffers from similar problem as
differences in contract language: records of
data will have a different structure from state
to state, as each locality adapts database to
20 5
local conditions.
Recognition of "red flags" indicating a need to
investigate further to protect against possible
206
fraud may depend on local knowledge.

As with implementation, there are again significant diseconomies of

scale in enforcing a Medicaid policy. Enforcement here involves
working with individual beneficiaries to enroll in these plans, and
economies of scope apply to give a state agency an advantage over a
federal one. Meanwhile, localized knowledge also helps in properly
analyzing encounter data, and recognizing whether additional audits are
necessary.
F. Summary

In the end, this federalism framework suggests that the current
division of Medicaid policy takes advantage of existing economies and
diseconomies of scale. The federal government's role in Medicaid is
one of providing financing and oversight to ensure states limit
"Medicaid Maximization" behavior. While additional constraints
should be applied to further reduce Medicaid Maximization behavior, it
is appropriate that the locus of these constraints is at the federal level.
Meanwhile, there are diseconomies of scale in specifying which
populations are served and what services are provided; in negotiating
with plans to provide these services; in enrolling individual
203. Hoffman-Welch Interview, supra note 200.
204. State Medicaid management information systems (MMIS) are required to meet certain
federal requirements relating to compatibility with Medicare information, and giving information
on "beneficiaries and paid claims." YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 144.
205. Staff Interview, supra note 178. See also YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at 131-32
(pointing out that although there are some consistencies, there remains a "lack of accurate, timely,
and reliable Medicaid policy and program data at the national level").
206. Hoffman-Welch Interview, supra note 200. See also YELLOW BOOK, supra note 185, at
143 ("States are required to operate a Medicaid fraud and abuse control unit").
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beneficiaries; and in collecting encounter data. These all suggest that
the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing Medicaid
policy is properly placed with state governments. This example
illustrates how this federalism framework can be used to allocate
responsibility for enactment, implementation, and enforcement of a
policy between the federal government and the states.
V. CONCLUSION

When it comes to federalism, many people agree with Lee Hamilton,
former Congressman from Indiana and vice chairman of the 9/11
Commission, 20 7 who wrote, "Early in my congressional career, I
discovered a simple truth about our [federalist] governmental system:
it's confusing." 20 8 This Article attempts to make the daunting task of
understanding federalism more manageable by separating our analysis
into the individual institutions behind policy. It presents a framework
that divides federalism analysis into components of enactment,
implementation, and enforcement. This framework then provides the
opportunity to consider how responsibility for different phases of an
individual policy should be divided between federal and state
governments. In making this assessment, economies of scale for these
individual phases are compared with diseconomies of scale. The
technique for performing this analysis is demonstrated with a
comparison between environmental policies for endangered species and
wetlands, and with an analysis of a health care policy.
Our comparison of environmental policies suggests that economies of
scale in enactment mean that there is a clearer need for enacting
protection of endangered species at a federal level. The interplay of
both economies and diseconomies for implementation suggests that the
principal federal role should be to establish baseline protections, while
states should be responsible for establishing additional levels of
protection and for data collection relevant to protecting species and
wetlands. Finally, the presence of significant diseconomies of scale in
enforcement suggests that primary responsibility for issuing both
species and wetlands permits should lie with the states.
Furthermore, our analysis of the health care policy, Medicaid,
suggests that the existing division of responsibility between federal and

207. For more on the 9/11 Commission, also known as the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, see http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/ (discussing the
commission, its history, and its duties).
208. Lee Hamilton, Why Federalism Works (2003),
http://congress.indiana.edu/radiocommentaries/why-federalism _works.php.
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state government is consistent with the relative importance of
economies and diseconomies of scale. The primary federal roles of
providing financial support and oversight for Medicaid correspond to
the principal economies of scale in enactment. Meanwhile, the
significant diseconomies of scale in implementation and enforcement
lead to state control of contracting with health plans to serve Medicaid
populations, enrolling beneficiaries, and collecting encounter data to
properly set capitation payments.
These analyses of environmental and health care policies demonstrate
that there are certain key considerations in analyzing economies and
diseconomies of scale across institutions. For enactment, one must
determine the economies and diseconomies related to the political
effects of the distributions of benefits and costs, along with the ability to
reduce social losses through increases in the tax base.
For
implementation, one should consider the benefits of establishing broad
baselines, the collection of information and storage in databases, and the
role of local knowledge in determining rules. And for enforcement, one
again must recognize the significance of local information in applying
rules, along with economies of scope that arise in staffing.
The analyses also provide guidance for legislatures and courts as they
address issues of federalism. While some claim that delegation of
federal power could be considered unconstitutional,2 °9 this Article
provides a positive political economic theory that can serve as a
foundation for the constitutionality of federalist delegation.
A
legislature considering a new policy needs to determine the appropriate
locus for the policy, across each of the enactment, implementation, and
enforcement institutions. The legislature could start with a single policy
analysis, as was done with health care, identifying economies and
diseconomies of scale. If an existing policy has similar characteristics
to the proposed policy, the legislature could leverage its understanding
of the economies and diseconomies of the existing policy through a
comparison of the proposed policy with the existing policy.
Where economies of scale are dominant, the appropriate locus would
be at the federal level; while where diseconomies of scale are dominant,
the appropriate locus would be at the state or local level. In instances
where there are both significant economies and diseconomies, a
structure involving both federal and state levels may be appropriate.
Performing this analysis at each level would thereby permit the
legislature to properly structure responsibility for enactment,
209. See Sarnoff, supra note 38, at 209 ("[T]he delegation of federal power to states poses
more substantial accountability concerns.").
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implementation, and enforcement. In doing so, a federal legislature
should recognize the need for federal oversight when it devolves
responsibility for implementation or enforcement to state and local
governments. It should also recall the requirements for properly
structuring federal oversight to conform to the holding in New York v.
2 10
United States.
One implication of this framework is to provide a criterion for
determining when federal preemption would be appropriate. When
economies of scale are significantly larger than diseconomies of scale
for each of the enactment, implementation, and enforcement
institutions, it will be more efficient to carry out policy at the national
level, and hence, federal law should preempt state law. Thus, if
economies of scale in regulating medical devices were clearly larger
than diseconomies of scale, it would be appropriate for federal law to
preempt state tort claims, as the court held in Riegel v. Medtronic.
Courts can also utilize this framework to provide some limit to
federal power. As seen in the analyses performed above, the framework
does not always provide a bright-line classification for the appropriate
locus of policies. Nonetheless, a limit to federal power may be drawn
when the policy considered involves relatively minimal economies of
scale. For wetlands, while there were significant economies of scale for
wetlands that are part of a multi-state hydrogeological system, there
were only minimal economies of scale for wetlands affecting systems
completely contained in one state. As a result, a case like Rapanos
could be decided on federalism grounds using this framework, where
the court could distinguish constitutional federal action to protect
wetlands that are part of multistate systems, from unconstitutional
211
federal action to protect wetlands that are part of only local systems.
Thus, the federalism framework presented here provides a
comprehensive and yet comprehensible mechanism for legislatures and
courts to structure the responsibility for enacting, implementing, and
enforcing policies to take advantage of economies and diseconomies of
scale, thereby enabling the achievement of these policies at the lowest
cost.

2 10. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 (discussing New York v. UnitedStates).
211. Recall, however, that the interconnectedness of most hydro-geological systems means
that there would be relatively few wetlands that would fit in the latter category.

